Weaponised Trade rarely operates through a single uniform mechanism. Rather, states employ a broad spectrum of coercive tools that range from highly formal legal restrictions to informal administrative disruption, selective non-enforcement, consumer mobilisation, and technologically targeted controls. These mechanisms vary substantially in visibility, legal formality, evidentiary clarity, and economic effect. In many cases, the coercive impact derives not from outright prohibition, but from uncertainty, delay, signalling, or the strategic manipulation of regulatory dependence.
Goods-restrictive Weaponised Trade most frequently uses mechanisms or interventions at or before the border, including import and export prohibitions, customs procedures (particularly sanitary and phytosanitary measures) and fees. Import restrictions range from outright import bans and quotas to licensing suspensions, enhanced inspections, customs delays, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. The main types are discussed below.
Less frequently, measures may be more ‘behind the border’, in the form of technical regulations, government procurement policies, or antidumping and countervailing investigation. The selection of mechanism inevitably is influenced by the nature of the targeted product, the political objectives of the instigator, and the extent to which the instigator seeks either visibility or plausible deniability.
1. Import Bans and Quotas
Import bans and quotas are amongst the most visible and economically disruptive forms of Weaponised Trade. These measures restrict or prohibit the entry of goods into the instigator’s market, either completely or in specified quantities, and are particularly effective where the target economy is highly dependent upon access to that market. The dataset demonstrates that bans and quotas may operate through both formal legal instruments and informal administrative practices, with the latter often allowing governments to preserve plausible deniability while still generating substantial commercial disruption.
Formal import bans typically involve clearly identifiable legal or regulatory action. One prominent example is Russia’s broad prohibition on food imports from several Western countries following sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. These widely imposed bans were formalised in legislation and impacted food imports from the European Union, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Albania, Montenegro, Liechtenstein, Ukraine, and the United States.[1] These measures were officially announced and formed part of a broader geopolitical confrontation involving sanctions and countersanctions. Similarly, the Saudi Arabia-led embargo against Qatar involved formal restrictions on trade, transport, and commercial interaction, implemented through official government action.[2] In these cases, the visibility and comprehensiveness of the restrictions formed part of the coercive effect itself.
Other disputes demonstrate the use of more targeted or sector-specific bans. China’s suspension of seafood imports from Japan following the release of treated wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear facility illustrates how import bans may be justified through public health or environmental concerns while simultaneously attracting allegations of coercive intent.[3]
Formal bans are also used in relation to services. For example, section 2.8.4 above describes the case study of the Dutch government banning its companies from providing maintenance and repair services of equipment located in China.[4]
Informal or de facto import bans are also common. These measures are often implemented through customs administration, licensing delays, intensified inspections, or unofficial instructions to importers, rather than through written legal instruments. China’s restrictions on Australian lobster exports in 2020 are a widely cited example. While no formal ban was publicly announced, shipments reportedly remained stranded at Chinese customs facilities awaiting inspection, effectively preventing market entry.[5] Similar dynamics appeared in disputes involving Philippine bananas,[6]Vietnamese lychees,[7] and Taiwanese fruit products,[8] where enhanced inspections, customs disruption, or administrative obstruction created the practical effect of an import prohibition without a formally declared ban. Measures specifically related to health and safety are discussed further in Section 2.9.2 below.
Quotas or quantitative restrictions feature in several case studies, both formally and informally. For example, regarding Australian cotton, the Chinese government threatened to impose a quota at the same time that Chinese spinning mills were reportedly being discouraged from using Australian cotton.[9] In the rare earths dispute between China and Japan, there were a range of measures that included quantitative restrictions, export price maintenance, and export bans.[10]
2. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Issues
Coercion can take place through ostensibly technical or administrative measures such as enhanced inspections, testing regimes, and requiring a degree of compliance over and above what is usually required. Health and safety issues are especially vulnerable to weaponisation precisely because there is often a sizeable discretionary element to inspection and enforcement.
For example, Russia imposed an import ban on Lithuanian dairy products, citing food safety concerns and notifying the WTO of emergency import restrictions due to the “detection of incompliance to microbiology, sanitary chemical and organoleptic requirements.”[11] While this has been one of many notifications made by Russia against Lithuania over time[12], it was regarded by Lithuania as being a coercive response to broader tensions, especially Lithuania’s role as president of the European Union.[13]
Other examples included using selective or inconsistent enforcement of SPS standards against politically targeted states while comparable products from other trading partners continue to enter the market under ordinary procedures. Case studies included:
- Enhanced inspections with repeated sampling, testing and documentation checks, which slow clearance and increase spoilage risks for fresh products; [14]
- Suspending export permits[15] or failing to renew permits;
- Suspending bilateral technical engagement mechanisms, including quarantine inspections, plant audits, accreditation visits or regulatory cooperation processes necessary for maintaining export access; [16]
- Imposing heightened testing or certification requirements exceeding previous practice or international norms, such as more onerous microbiological testing, pest detection regimes, residue testing or additional certification demands;[17] and
- Adopting a more onerous SPS regime in response to a finding of pests – for example preventing an import rather than fumigating where this is the usual course of action.[18]
Claims of economic coercion can be difficult to assess in the SPS context because measures are often imposed within complex legal and scientific regulations and procedures, with states retaining substantial administrative discretion. As a result, coercive intent may be difficult to isolate from ordinary regulatory practice, although indicators of the timing, selectivity, or intensity of enforcement can suggest a coercive political objective.
3. Tariffs
Tariffs were relatively less common as a weaponised trade measure during the time period in the dataset, except by the United States under the first Trump administration. This trend ramped up strongly in 2025 under the second Trump administration. The United States has been especially explicit in linking tariffs with non-trade concerns, but this occurred in the first Trump administration as well. For example, In May 2019 US President Donald Trump stated that the US would impose new tariffs on all US imports from Mexico, unless the Mexican government took decisive action to end the flow of undocumented migrants across the border.[19]
The dataset showed tariffs imposed along with other measures, such as additional border fees imposed alongside tariffs by China on Mongolian metals,[20] and the long running actions by the US against Chinese solar panels, which included tariffs alongside a range of other measures, including antidumping and countervailing duties.
4. Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
Antidumping and countervailing duties are formal legal measures which are often imposed for protectionist reasons but are done so as legitimate mechanisms available under the WTO Agreements. They can however also be used coercively, as they allow domestic investigators a wide margin of discretion that can be used to ‘tilt’ the outcome of an investigation so that a duty can be applied. This is a well-known weakness of the existing rules.
The most prominent examples are China’s antidumping and countervailing measures against Australian barley (2018) and wine (2020), during a particularly fraught period in Australia-China relations. The duties were ultimately removed following an improvement in bilateral political relations, a sequence of events that reinforced perceptions that the investigations were connected to broader geopolitical tensions rather than solely conventional trade remedy concerns.
WTO rules allow investigating authorities unusually broad evidentiary and methodological discretion such as the scope under Article 6.8 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article 12.7 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement to rely on ‘available facts’ if information is considered not forthcoming or is considered to ‘impede the investigation’. It allows for the investigating authority to be particular about the way in which evidence is presented, and the timelines, and to ignore otherwise relevant evidence. As Williams explains, in the barley dispute, Chinese authorities appeared unwilling to accept that production and price data could not be particularised in the requested fashion due to the structure of Australia’s barley industry, and disregarded the submitted data.[21]
5. Consumer Boycotts
Consumer boycotts and politically encouraged purchasing (or non-purchasing) campaigns may appear to be spontaneous consumer responses to a political situation, and therefore outside the definition of Weaponised Trade. However, they also frequently emerge through quasi-official signalling, industry association guidance, state-linked media narratives, or informal administrative encouragement. This ambiguity can make them especially attractive tools of economic coercion because they allow states to exert economic pressure while avoiding direct governmental responsibility.
In many instances, governments do not formally prohibit trade but instead encourage consumers, distributors, retailers, or industry groups to reduce commercial engagement with the target state.
For example, boycotts in 2019 had a substantial impact on the Malaysian palm oil industry following criticism by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of India’s actions in Kashmir and its citizenship reforms. In response, India’s Solvent Extractors’ Association of India (SEAI), the country’s leading vegetable oil trade body, issued an advisory urging its 875 members to refrain from purchasing Malaysian palm oil because of “strained relations” between the two states. And to “show solidarity” with India by avoiding Malaysian imports.[22] Although India did not initially impose a formal import prohibition, the mechanism was an effective combination of industry pressure, political signalling and state encouragement.
Similarly, the Maldives-India boycott dispute showed the power of consumer nationalism amplified by social media. Following political tensions between the two countries, calls to boycott Maldivian tourism circulated widely within India, accompanied by online mobilisation encouraging consumers to redirect tourism expenditure toward domestic alternatives. While not necessarily state-directed in a formal sense, the dispute illustrated how governments, political elites, media actors and online campaigns may interact to create coercive economic pressure without the need for conventional trade restrictions.
Boycotts are also effective against foreign services – especially tourism and education – these are Mode 2 services in GATS terms and require the consumer to travel to the target country to ‘consume’ the service. In order to weaponise these services, it then becomes necessary to restrict or deter the consumer from travelling.
Because boycott activity can be framed as spontaneous consumer behaviour, patriotic solidarity, or independent commercial decision-making, it falls outside the conventional categories associated with formal trade restrictions. At the same time the economic effects may be severe, particularly where governments possess the capacity to shape media narratives, mobilise nationalist sentiment, or indirectly influence commercial intermediaries.
It is also worth noting that consumer boycotts are not just a potential targeting device, but also a type of civil society response to the weaponisation of trade in the target country. This type of response is discussed in Chapter 3 of the report.
6. Sanctions and Embargoes
Sanctions and embargoes frequently blur the boundary between economic coercion and the legitimate exercise of rights under international law. They may function as devices to deter or punish military escalation, but also may be precursors of or take place alongside kinetic conflict.
Embargoes operate at a whole-of-country level and are designed to impose widespread economic, political and symbolic isolation upon the target state. An embargo typically involves a formal prohibition on trade, transport, travel, and diplomatic engagement, often accompanied by restrictions on maritime transit, aviation access, financial flows, or logistical connectivity. A sanction is typically more focussed, and will restrict particular types of services or goods, and may also place limitations on interaction with particular types of individuals.
When sanction-type measures are imposed, the instigator will often maintain that they are in fact legitimate corrective actions, or legitimate countermeasures. The target, on the other hand, will assert that they are illegitimate or coercive by nature. In many cases, the legal position is unclear.
There is a vast body of international legal scholarship concerning the legality and legitimacy of embargoes, sanctions and countermeasures, with questions frequently arising regarding proportionality, collective security, humanitarian impact, extraterritoriality, and consistency with international economic obligations. Within the framework of weaponised trade, however, the emphasis is less upon formal legal categorisation and more upon the use of economic interdependence as an instrument of strategic pressure. In this context, some autonomous sanctions in particular are characterised as forms of economic coercion where they are imposed outside the framework of United Nations Security Council authorisation, but equally are not corrective measures required or permitted by international law.[23] This issue is discussed further in Chapter 4 of this report.
Examples of these mechanisms within the case studies database are the coordinated measures imposed against Qatar in 2017 by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. These measures extended far beyond ordinary trade restrictions to include severing diplomatic relations, prohibited trade, restricted airspace and maritime access, and extensive travel and logistical constraints. The resulting disruption affected food security, aviation routes, shipping networks, finance and regional supply chains.[24]
Russia’s embargoes on food and agricultural imports from a wide range of countries as well as the European Union followed sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea. While formally framed as countermeasures responding to Western sanctions, the breadth of the restrictions transformed them into instruments of geopolitical signalling and economic retaliation.[25] Similarly, the European Union’s restrictions on Russian crude oil following the invasion of Ukraine illustrate how sanctions measures are both widely used but also contested as coercive.
7. Export Restrictions
Export restrictions differ structurally from import restrictions because they rely upon asymmetries in supply rather than asymmetries in market access. Their effectiveness depends upon the instigator controlling access to a scarce, indispensable, or difficult-to-substitute input. This dynamic is particularly visible in the rare earths dispute between China and Japan in 2010.[26] China’s restrictions on exports of rare earth minerals, tungsten, and molybdenum to Japan occurred against the backdrop of tensions surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute. Because China occupied a dominant position in global rare earth processing and supply chains, the restrictions generated substantial concern regarding industrial vulnerability and strategic dependence within Japan and other advanced economies.
8. Selective Enforcement and Non-Enforcement of Rights
Coercion can also be implemented through selective regulatory enforcement rather than through explicit trade restrictions, as the Lotte case study in section 2.8.4 above demonstrates. Existing laws concerning taxation, planning, health and safety, environmental compliance, labour regulation, or consumer protection may provide governments with extensive discretion regarding investigation and enforcement.
One particularly unusual (and interesting) example emerged from tensions between Lithuania and China in 2021. Lithuanian exporters reported that the country had been removed from the Chinese Customs Database, making it impossible for Lithuanian goods to be imported into China.[27] This occurred in conjunction with a range of other informal measures that Lithuania described in its WTO complaint as “ novel, numerous, recurrent, persisting and strongly correlated in temporal and substantive terms.”[28] While this appears a one-off scenario, it serves as an important illustration of the kind of informal mechanisms that can be used to very effectively weaponise trade, while still allowing the instigator to maintain plausible deniability, for example by attributing the issue to a systems error.
The dispute between Moldova and Russia over gas supply is another illustration of this dynamic. In 2021, Russian state-owned enterprise Gazprom sought enforcement through arbitration of a relatively small and recent debt owed by Moldova, in the context of escalating tensions. While Gazprom was legally entitled to enforce the debt, it did so in context where larger and much longer-held debts owed by Russian-sympathetic region of Transnistria had not been pursued – USD11 billion as against USD 86 million.[29] The disparity of enforcement policy was one of the reasons that an otherwise legal entitlement was characterised as coercive.
[1] See ‘Russia’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/tag/russia/>.
[2] ‘All Trade: Qatar–Saudi Arabia’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2017/06/05/saudi-arabia-bans-all-trade-with-qatar-in-june-2017/>.
[3] ‘Seafood: Japan–China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2023/08/31/seafood-japan-china/>.
[4] ‘Semiconductor Technology: China–Netherlands’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database.<https://economiccoercion.com/2023/06/30/semiconductor-technology-china-netherlands/>.
[5] ‘Lobster: Australia–China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2020/11/30/lobster-australia-china/>.
[6] ‘Bananas: Philippines–China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2012/03/30/bananas-philippines-china/>.
[7] ‘Lychees: Vietnam–China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2014/05/01/lychees-vietnam-china/>.
[8] As seen in; ‘Mangoes: Taiwan–China’ Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database<https://economiccoercion.com/2023/08/31/mangoes-taiwan-china/>, ‘Apples: Taiwan–China’ , Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2021/09/30/apples-taiwan-china/>, ‘Pineapples: Taiwan–China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2021/03/31/pineapples-taiwan-china/>.
[9] ‘Cotton: Australia–China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2020/10/31/cotton-australia-china/>.
[10] ‘Rare Earths: Japan–China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2010/09/30/rare-earths-china-japan/>.
[11] Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Notification of Emergency Measures – Russian Federation – Milk and Dairy products, WTO Doc G/SPS/N/RUS/35 (11 October 2013).
[12] For a full list of SPS notifications made by Russia against Lithuania, see Sanitary and Phytosanitary Information Management System, WTO Documents Online (Web Page) https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S008.aspx?NotifyingCountryList=%22Russian+Federation%22+OR+%22U.S.S.R.%22&AffectedCountryList=%22Lithuania%22&Language=ENGLISH&AttachmentSelection=BOTH&SearchPage=FE_S_S003&SubjectList=&languageUIChanged=true#.
[13] ‘Dairy Products: Lithuania–Russia’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2013/11/23/dairy-products-lithuania-russia/>.
[14] ‘Lobster: Australia–China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2020/11/30/lobster-australia-china/>. For further information pertaining to food quality and increased spoilage risks see, ‘Salmon: Norway–China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Databasehttps://economiccoercion.com/2010/10/08/salmon-norway-china/
[15] ‘Canola Seeds: Canada–China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2019/03/31/canola-seeds-canada-china/>.
[16] ‘Hay and Chaff: Australia –China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database<https://economiccoercion.com/2021/02/28/hay-and-chaff-australia-china/>.
[17] Examples include Russia’s intensified sanitary scrutiny of Lithuanian dairy products, China’s restrictions on Canadian canola and Taiwanese fruit, and China’s extensive testing and import restrictions on Japanese seafood following the Fukushima wastewater release.
[18] ‘Timber: Australia–China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database<https://economiccoercion.com/2020/11/30/timber-australia-china/>.
[19] ‘Tariffs: Mexico–United States’ Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database<https://economiccoercion.com/2019/05/31/tariffs-mexico-united-states/>.
[20] ‘Mining Commodities: Mongolia–China’ Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database<https://economiccoercion.com/2016/11/30/mining-commodities-mongolia-china/>.
[21] Brett Williams, “The Choice of ‘Facts Available’ in China – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Barley from Australia WT/DS598” (June 2023) Williams Trade Law Newsletter No 2, 3 <http://www.williamstradelaw.com/files/WILLIAMS%20Brett_Lhd_2023%2006%20NwsLtr%20No%202%20Facts%20Available%20Barley.pdf>.
[22] Upasana Bhat and Pratik Jakhar, ‘What’s the link between palm oil and the Kashmir dispute?’, BBC News (online,1 January 2020) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50317980>
[23] See, for example, Maarten Smeets, ‘Economic Sanctions and the WTO’ in Peter AG Van Bergeijk (ed), Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021) 280. See also, Steve Charnovitz, ‘Rethinking WTO trade sanctions’ (2001) 95(4) American Journal of International Law 792.
[24] ‘All Trade: Qatar–Saudi Arabia,’ Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database<https://economiccoercion.com/2017/06/05/saudi-arabia-bans-all-trade-with-qatar-in-june-2017/>.
[25] ‘Food: European Union–Russia,’ Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database<https://economiccoercion.com/2014/04/01/food-european-union-russia/>.
[26] ‘Rare Earths: Japan–China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2010/09/30/rare-earths-china-japan/>.
[27] ‘Customs Database: Lithuania–China’, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2021/11/30/customs-database-lithuania-china/>.
[28] China — Measures Concerning Trade in Goods and Services, WTO Doc WT/DS610/1 (27 January 2022) (Request for Consultations by the European Union) <https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/DS/610-1.pdf&Open=True>.
[29] ‘Gas: Moldova–Russia, Weaponised Trade and Economic Coercion Case Studies Database <https://economiccoercion.com/2023/09/30/gas-russia-moldova/>. See further, Vladimir Solovyov, ‘Transnistria’s Energy Crisis Could Backfire on Moscow’, Carnegie Politika (Commentary, 11 January 2025) <https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/01/moldova-gas-crisis-solution>.
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