FOOD (AUSTRALIA – RUSSIA)

Russia imposes 12-month food import ban from Australia in August 2014.

Context

In August 2014, Russia imposed a 12 month ban on imports of Australian food (as well as those from the US, Canada, the EU, and Norway – later expanded to also include Iceland, Montenegro, Liechtenstein, and Albania) – including beef, fish, pork, fruit and vegetables, and dairy. Announcing the ban on August 7, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev called it a “full embargo”. This Weaponised Trade measure was a tit-for-tat response to sanctions imposed on Russia by those countries related to Russia’s involvement in separatist conflict in Ukraine. This was openly acknowledged by Prime Minister Medvedev, who told press that “[w]e (Russia) hoped until the very last that our foreign colleagues would realize that sanctions are a dead end and that nobody needs them” adding “[t]hings have turned out in such a way that we have to implement retaliatory measures.” Notably, Australia’s beef exports to Russia had already been suspended since April 2014, due to alleged breaches of trenbolone growth promotant (hormones) rules.

Russia initially extended this ban on food imports by a further year in June 2015, again in retaliation against an extension of Western sanctions. These bans have subsequently repeatedly been extended, with the fifth announced in January 2021, and the sixth in 2022. The seventh, in 2023, added additional seafood products to the list of banned goods. The list of formal updates from the Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry can be found here.

Impact

Contemporaneous media reporting estimated Australian agricultural exports to Russia to be worth over AU$400 million per year – including AU$150 million in beef exports, AU$64 million in butter, AU$48 million in non-beef meats, and AU$55 million in non-seafood live animals. International reporting suggested that this Weaponised Trade measure was likely to increase food prices for Russian consumers, but was unlikely to have major impacts on targeted food producers such as Australia. The below table (from Australia’s SBS News) show the figures for Australian food exports to Russia for the previous year (2013).

Responses

(i) Australian Industry Responses

Farmer and former head of Australia’s National Farmers Federation, Duncan Fraser, described the measures to press as “a tit-for-tat retaliation” and suggested that it was likely that Russia’s punitive measures would be “lifted rather than extended anywhere else” after geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe “die down a little bit.” On August 8 the National Farmers Federation issued a statement, voicing “concern” over the measures and calling for “a strong commitment from the Australian Government to work closely with the farm sector to facilitate the movement of produce to alternative markets, which would have otherwise been exported to Russia.” 

Australian dairy industry leader Barry Irvin suggested that Australian dairy would likely not be directly impacted by the measures, as Russia was not a major importer of Australian products. Notably, however, Irvin claimed that much EU dairy also banned from Russia would likely be looking for alternative markets, which could bring it into conflict with Australia. Therefore, Irvin predicted “a major shift in global supply and demand” that  “is not good news for the Australian dairy industry”.

Similarly, head of Australia’s National Farmers’ Federation, Brent Finlay, told press that “a key concern for Australia will be around the global marketplace and the flow-on effects to the Australian farm sector, a cornerstone of the Australian economy. As the ban was placed on a number of key western trading partners, we may see increased competition from these players affected by the ban, as they look to sell their products to other markets. . . With more produce potentially coming onto the market, we may see a shift in current supply arrangements and, in the worst case scenario, a drop in prices for Australian produce – ultimately hitting the back pockets of Australian farmers.” 

(ii) Australian Government Responses 

Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop responded by criticising Moscow for acting “in a retaliatory manner rather than respond to international concern by halting the supply of heavy weapons to the separatists.” Minister Bishop also committed government support to impacted industries, saying that “[t]he Australian Government will do everything in its power to minimise the impact on Australian agricultural producers, including through new trade agreements and the opening up of alternative markets for their produce”.

Then Australian agriculture minister, Barnaby Joyce, responded by downplaying Canberra’s ability to resolve the conflict through diplomacy, telling press “(we) can’t really do anything about what Russia, as a sovereign nation, decides to do” and adding that “[w]e just try to work with these issues as they are presented to us, knowing I can’t really affect Mr Putin and what Mr Putin decides to do. Most of the time I have a real struggle trying to affect my own colleagues.” However, at the same time Minister Joyce did point towards ongoing government action to find alternative export markets, saying that“[l]ast night and yesterday I was talking to the Indonesians about their capacity for the purchase of more beef and dairy products” and further suggesting that “[h]opefully, if we manage this properly, we can find alternate markets to basically purchase the quota that the Russians don’t”. In particular, initial Australian government support was reportedly centred around “manag[ing] those exports that are currently at sea or in transit to Russian markets and assist[ing] exporters in redirecting them, wherever possible, to alternative destinations.”

(iii) Third Party Responses

According to the New York Times, “Western experts read Thursday’s blanket ban as an alarming signal that hard-liners close to Mr. Putin were gaining influence.” Because these measures also applied to the US, EU, and others, Western countries were broadly united in their condemnatory response. For example, US President Barack Obama told press thatPutin was “going to be hurting his economy and his own people over the long term.” International reporting suggested that the EU was more exposed than Australia to these mechanisms, due to its larger trade relationship with Russia.  Within Russia, the normally loyal opposition Communist Party challenged the government when it began destroying stockpiles of sanctioned imported goods – calling instead for it to be given away to charitable causes.

Status

Media reports do not suggest that this case has yet been resolved.

References & Further Information

Al Jazeera. 2014. “Russia bans food imports from West.” Al Jazeera. August 8. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2014/8/8/russia-bans-food-imports-from-west

Australian Government. 2015. “Market Advice. Russia – Continuation of trade suspension in Australian agricultural and food exports.” Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. July 3. Available at: https://www.agriculture. gov.au/biosecurity-trade/export/controlled-goods/fish/fish-notices/market-access-advice-notices-2015/2015-10

Australian Government. 2021. “Market Advice: Multiple Commodities. Food Import Ban Extended.” Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.  January 19. https://www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/export/controlled-goods/fish/fish-notices/2021/2021-02

K. Barlow. 2014. “Russia bans food imports from Australia, US, EU over sanctions; Julie Bishop ‘disappointed’ by Russian retaliation.” ABC News. August 7. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-07/russia-bans-food-imports-from-australia-us-eu/5656434

BBC News. 2015. “Russia adds countries to food import ban over sanctions.” BBC News. August 13. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-33905340

S. Benjamin. 2014. “Russia hits Australia, US, EU with food embargo.” SBS News. August 7. Available at: https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/russia-hits-australia-us-eu-with-food-embargo/l8m6txpcj

S. Capelouto. 2014. “Russia’s Putin issues retaliatory ban on food imports.” CNN. August 6. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/06/world/europe/russia-ukraine-crisis/index.html

C. Chase. “Russia adds more seafood products to import bans from “unfriendly countries””. Seafood Source. July 26. Available at: https://www.seafoodsource.com/ news/supply-trade/russia-adds-more-seafood-products-to-import-bans-from-unfriendly-countries

M. Kiselyova and M. Geller. 2014. “Russian import ban to have limited effect on Western food firms.” Reuters. August 8. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/world/ russian-import-ban-to-have-limited-effect-on-western-food-firms-idUSKBN0G7225/

J. Linden. 2014. “Australia Counts the Cost of Russian Food Import Ban.” The Poultry Site. August 11. Available at: https://www.thepoultrysite.com/news/2014/08/australia-counts-the-cost-of-russian-food-import-ban

U. Mauder. 2021. “Russia keeps EU, Australia food import ban.” The Canberra Times. September 21. Available at: https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7438725/russia-keeps-eu-australia-food-import-ban/

N. MacFarquhar. 2014. “Russia Responds to Western Sanctions With Import Bans of Its Own.” New York Times. August 7. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/ 08/world/europe/russia-sanctions.html

J. Nason. 2014. “Russian ban: beef, cattle and roo meat exports in spotlight.” Beef Central. August 8. Available at: https://www.beefcentral.com/trade/export/russian-ban-beef-cattle-and-roo-meat-exports-in-spotlight/

National Farmers Federation. 2014. “Farmers concerned with Russia’s ban on food imports.” National Farmers Federation. August 8. Available at: https://nff.org.au/media-release/farmers-concerned-with-russias-ban-on-food-imports/

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. 2014. “Russia Bans Food Imports From U.S., EU, Australia, Canada, Norway.” Radio Free Liberty and Radio Liberty. August 7. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-food-embargo/26518515.html

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