UAE bans all trade with Qatar in June 2017

Context

On June 5, 2017, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was part of a Saudi-led coalition of states that cut trade and diplomatic ties with Qatar, while heavily restricting bilateral trade. The UAE was one of the core four partners in this coalition, alongside Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Bahrain. Additional junior members of the coalition, that supported through a range of more limited measures, included (one claimant to) the Libyan government, Yemen, and the Maldives.

According to reporting, the UAE’s leader, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan was partly motivated to join in the measures by opposition to Qatar’s interest in democratic governance. The same reporting cited Wikileaks as revealing that in 2009 Sheik Mohammed had called Qatar “part of the Muslim Brotherhood” (that Qatar is opposed to).  

In addition to the broad economic, travel and airspace blockade imposed by each of the anti-Qatar coalition states, each imposed varying additional measures against Qatar reflecting their unique circumstances. On July 27, 2017, it was reported that the UAE had told its financial institutions and banks to blacklist those entities and persons linked to Qatar. And, along with Bahrain, the UAE also criminalised “sympathy” with Qatar.

Impact

Prior to the imposition of these measures, Qatar and the UAE had major trade relations. For example, in 2015 the bilateral trade between the UAE and Qatar was valued at approximately US$7.17 billion. According to one study, exports from the UAE to Qatar “fell from QAR 2.5bn in Q1 2017 toQAR 141m in Q4 2019.”

Qatar initially experienced some food shortages and hoarding. However, this short-term impact was alleviated by alternative suppliers from Turkey and Iran. Airspace restrictions also led Qatar’s national carrier, Qatar Airways, to have to re-route flights. And new sources of building materials were required for Qatar to continue building infrastructure to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

However, claims from a Qatar-based analyst suggested that, despite short-term pain, “[i]n key ways, the blockade bolstered Qatar’s economy” because it  “helped it become more self-sufficient and kick-started the country’s economic diversification efforts.” Notably, despite these measure’s Qatar’s economy reportedly grew by 2.4% in 2018 and around 3.1% in 2019.

Responses  

i) Qatar government and industry responses.

The Qatar government responded to the UAE specifically by accusing the UAE government of racial discrimination at the UN’s International Court of Justice. At the same time, the Government of Qatar also reportedly attempted to freeze the Qatar-based assets of the UAE’s ruling family member Sheikh Abdullah bin Ali Al Thani – a move denounced by the UAE-based Emirates Association for Human Rights as a “flagrant violation of human rights that has become a systematic approach of intimidation adopted by Qatar.”

More generally, responding to the imposition of these measures on July 5, 2017, Qatar’s foreign minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani accused the anti-Qatar coalition of “demanding that we (Qatar) have to surrender our sovereignty”, adding that Qatar would “never do” that. Sheikh Mohammed also stated that “Qatar continues to call for dialogue, despite the violation of international laws and regulations, despite the separation of 12,000 families, despite the siege that is a clear aggression and an insult to all international treaties, bodies and jurisdictions”. Additionally, in August 2017 Qatar requested WTO consultations with Bahrain (and Saudi Arabia and the UAE) over what it called “coercive attempts at economic isolation”. 

Qatar also responded economically to these measures by ramping up its trade links with Turkey and Iran. It also expanded investment links with Southeast Asia.  

At the same time, Qatar sought to respond to food security vulnerabilities exposed through these measures (90% of Qatar’s pre-blockade food was imported), Qatar invested in domestic food production, which reportedly grew by around 400% from 2017-19. Notably, Qatar became self-sufficient in dairy by 2019 by growing a domestic dairy industry, having previously imported around 72% of its consumption. Qatar’s leading dairy firm, Baladna, sourced around 18,000 Holstein dairy cows from Europe to boost its production.

(ii) UAE government and industry responses

The UAE successfully defended itself from a Qatari case at the UN’s International Court of Justice, by arguing that its blockade on Qatar was motivated not by racial discrimination but rather by opposition to Qatari nationals.

On June 23, 2017, AP News published a list of demands from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, that mediator Kuwait had presented to Qatar the previous day, June 22, on their behalf. If Qatar agreed to comply then it was offered an end to the trade and diplomatic measures. These demands were that Qatar should (summarised):

1. Downgrade economic, diplomatic and military ties with Iran
2. End relations with ‘terrorist groups’ such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah
3. Close the TV station Al-Jazeera and its affiliates
4. Close other news outlets funded by Qatar
5. End military cooperation with Turkey
6. End all funding for entities designated “terrorists” by the anti-Qatar coalition
7. Extradite terrorists and other wanted criminals from the anti-Qatar coalition to their countries of origin
8. End practice of granting citizenship to nationals wanted in anti-Qatar coalition states, and revoke the citizenships already granted for those wanted in anti-Qatar coalition states
9. End contacts with (and share intelligence on) political opposition figures in anti-Qatar coalition states
10. Pay reparations and compensation to anti-Qatar coalition states
11. Align Qatar with the anti-Qatar coalition in all matters militarily, politically, socially, and economically
12. Agree to these demands within 10 days of notification
13. Agree to regular audits to monitor compliance with these demands for up to 12 years

On July 5, 2017, the anti-Qatar coalition told press that Qatar had sent them a “negative response” to the demands. Subsequently, on July 18, 2017, the New York Times reported that “senior diplomats” from the anti-Qatar coalition had “indicated… that they were no longer insisting on 13 precise demands that the Qataris must satisfy, or on a specific deadline for them to comply.” At a press conference, Saudi Arabia’s UN Ambassador Abdullah bin Yahya Almouallimi said that “[o]ur aim is to reach a diplomatic solution” and that he was hoping that Qatar would “come around” to the anti-Qatar coalition’s point of view. Replacing the hardline list of 13 explicit demands was a smaller and less specific demands for agreement on six key principles, summarised by the New York Times as “combating terrorism and extremism, denying financing and safe havens to terrorist groups, stopping incitement to hatred and violence and refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.”

(ii) Other states’ government and industry responses

Kuwait’s early attempts to act as a mediator failed, as did those of US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson. Notably, US President Donald Trump commented on the initial blockade by appearing to side with the anti-Qatar coalition, saying that “[t]he nation of Qatar, unfortunately, has historically been a funder of terrorism at a very high level.” However, the US ultimately was viewed as playing a role in resolving the crisis.

Status

In January 2021, an agreement was reached ending these measures and restoring relations between the anti-Qatar coalition and Qatar, at a summit in the Saudi Arabian city of al-Ula. Two years later, in April 2023, it was reported that diplomatic relations would be restored between the UAE and Qatar, with an unnamed official telling press that “the activation of diplomatic ties, which will include the reopening of embassies, is under process.”  This reactivation of diplomatic ties had followed a February 2022 meeting between the leader of Qatar, Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and the de facto UAE leader, Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, on the sidelines of the Beijing Winter Olympics.

Reference list

Al Jazeera. 2022. “Qatar and UAE leaders meet for first time since Gulf crisis ended.” February 6. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/6/qatar-and-uae-leaders-meet-for-first-time-since-gulf-crisis-ended

Al Jazeera. 2023. “‘Work underway’ to restore Qatar-UAE ties: Doha.” April 18. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/18/qatar-and-uae-moving-to-restore-diplomatic-relations-report

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Al Jazeera. 2021. “UN’s top court dismisses Qatar discrimination case against UAE.” Al Jazeera. February 4. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/4/uns-top-court-dismisses-qatar-discrimination-suit-against-uae

AP News. 2017. “List of demands on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations.” June 23. Available at: https://apnews.com/general-news-3a58461737c44ad58047562e48f46e06

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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40173757

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