DEFENCE TECHNOLOGIES, DUAL USE TECHNOLOGIES & SECONDARY SANCTIONS [CHINA – EUROPEAN UNION]

European Union places restrictions on Chinese entities in relation to Russia-Ukraine conflict

Context

In December 2024 the European Union promulgated its 15th Package of restrictive measures with the stated objective of “address[ing] the circumvention of EU sanctions through targeting of Putin’s shadow fleet and weaken Russia’s military and industrial complex.”

Several of the entities targetted included Chinese entities that the EU argued have “been involved in the circumvention of trade restrictions or have engaged in the procurement of sensitive items used for Russian military operations, like UAVs and missiles.” In addition to Russian and Chinese enterprises and individuals, entities from the United Arab Emirates, Serbia, Iran and India were also targetted.

Media reported that restrictive measures were imposed on seven Chinese entities, “one individual and two entities facilitating the circumvention of EU sanctions, and four entities supplying sensitive drone components and microelectronic components to the Russian military.” According to Ukrainian Government estimates (as reported in Reuters) some 60% of the components of Russian weaponse are of Chinese origin.

The official instrument invoking these provisions is Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/3187 of 16 December 2024 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine

Responses  

i) Chinese Government

On 19 December 2024, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce responded to the 15th Package, claiming that these restrictive measures imposed to Chinese companies were ‘driven by political reasons, which will significantly disrupt the global supply chain and harm the bilateral relation between the EU and China’.

ii) Chinese Media

In early 2025, China Daily criticised the measures as economic coercion, stating “It is wishful thinking for Canada, the EU and the UK to believe they can employ coercive means such as economic sanctions to exert pressure on China in the hope that the latter will change its stance to be in line with theirs. Given the fact that Washington is engaged in direct negotiations with Russia for peaceful settlement of the conflict, the EU, the UK and Canada doubling down on their economic coercion targeting Russia and continued commitment to provide military assistance to Ukraine will only prolong the conflict.”

Reference list

European Union Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/3187 of 16 December 2024 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202403187

Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Response to the incident that the EU adopted the 15th package of Russia sanctions targeting Chinese companies’ [商务部新闻发言人就欧盟第15轮对俄制裁列单中国企业和个人事答记者问] (19 December 2024), available at: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/xwfb/xwfyrth/art/2024/art_fea80166e42346468bab443e67966059.html.

Reuters, ‘EU adopts new Russia sanctions targeting China, shadow fleet’ (18 December 2024), available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-adopts-new-russia-sanctions-targeting-china-shadow-fleet-2024-12-16/

Reuters / Julia Payne, ‘Ukraine says China is key route for foreign tech in Russian weapons’ (24 September 2024) available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-china-is-key-route-foreign-tech-russian-weapons-2024-09-24/

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