Russia threatens to cut gas to Moldova
Context
Before 30 September 2021, Russia’s state-owned energy firm Gazprom supplied gas to Moldova under the 2006 five-year contract, which had been extended annually. The contract’s pricing formula was based on oil price indexation, and the prevailing expectation through to late 2020, following the decrease of European hub prices to approximately $75 per thousand cubic metres (‘mcm), was that low hub prices would persist. This meant Moldova became incentivised to seek hub price indexation in any new contract. This expectation proved mistaken as hub prices rose steeply, reaching $900/mcm by September, rendering the original, oil-indexed contract comparatively advantageous.
As the contract neared expiry, negotiations proved ineffective. Gazprom offered a hub-indexed formula with a 25% discount, conditional on debt repayment, while Moldova sought a significantly deeper reduction, of USD 200-300/mcm. Unable to agree, the parties extended the existing contract by one month, though Gazprom simultaneously reduced volumes transported to Moldova by one third. This reduction meant Moldova received 54 million cubic units against its monthly right bank consumption of 80 mcm.
This depletion of linepack gas in the Moldovan transmission systems prompted an energy security crisis and official state of emergency from October 22 to November 20, as the national government sought alternative supplies to stabilise the grid. This included emergency imports from Poland, Ukraine, and EU-sourced gas.
A new five-year contract was concluded 29 October 2021, with gas flow resuming 1 November. However, within weeks, Gazprom threatened to suspend supply unless Moldova paid USD 73 million in alleged arrears for recent imports.
The basis for this threat reveals the arbitrary character of Gazprom’s contract enforcement. The structural basis for the debt claim itself was strategically manipulated. Moldovogaz, in which Gazprom holds a 50% stake, served as a single contracting party for both right bank Moldova and the Russian-aligned region of Transdniestria, and consolidated all regional gas liabilities under a single Moldovan legal entity. Transdniestria had not paid Gazprom since 2005, accumulating approximately USD 11.1 billion in liabilities. Comparatively, Gazprom pressed a USD 709 million claim against Moldova, which was later reduced by an independent international audit to just USD 8.6 millon. The contrast is stark. A USD 11.1 billion accumulated by a politically aligned region over two decades went unpursued, while a vastly smaller and largely unsubstantiated claim against Moldova was invoked as grounds for supply suspension within weeks of a new contract being signed. This is a deliberate and discriminatory application of contractual enforcement, with a blatantly political, rather than commercial purpose.
A pattern emerges when Russian-owned firms successfully establish a dependency relationship. This translates into political or economic leverage by arbitrarily adjusting the pricing of gas contracts. When a country falls out of political favour, gas price discounts are reversed and vice versa. Russia has a documented pattern of calibrating gas prices to political alignment. Allies receive subsidised rates, while states pursuing EU integration experience supply disruption.
This is best demonstrated by Russia’s confirmation that it would supply gas to ally Belarus at USD 128.5 per thousand cubic metres for 2022. A rate president Putin himself acknowledged was approximately five times below prevailing European market prices, boasting, “[W]e will leave the price for Belarus for next year, 2022, unchanged. The price for Belarus is $128.5/1,000 cu m. If you don’t know, I would like to inform you that the price on the European market is $650/1,000 cu m.” By comparison, Moldova was being charged $790 / mcm,
Observers have alleged that Gazprom’s actions had become radically political, following the election of pro-EU President Maia Sandu in 2020. As the Moldova crisis coincided with the election, experts argue that Moscow increased its tariffs to punish Chisinau for this election, which detracted from Russian agendas.
Responses
i) Moldovan government and industry responses.
The Moldovan government responded to Gazprom’s November 2021 ultimatum by reportedly paying the amount owed. However, by May 2023, Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean was publicly stating that, resulting from a diversification strategy, the country was now integrated within the European energy network and was no longer relying upon energy imports from Russia.
(ii) Russian government and industry responses
Again in November 2022, Gazprom threatened to cut part of its supply of gas to Moldova that was being transported through Ukraine, after alleging that Kyiv was responsible for syphoning some of these gas transfers. It later walked back on this threat, but at the same time made clear its ability to reduce or cut off gas flows to Moldova in the case of debt non-repayment.
(iii) Other states’ responses
The EU provided a US$70 million grant to Moldova in October 2021 aimed to help Moldova’s energy security during this period of uncertainty through provisions targeting Moldova’s most vulnerable residents. At the same time, during a joint press conference with Moldova’s Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell called Gazprom’s price increase request a “consequence of weaponisation of the gas supply” by Russia, but acknowledged the limits to EU support for Moldova, saying that a solution would “not come from the European Union funding all the differences between the current prices and the prices that Gazprom is asking for”. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) announced a €300 million loan to support Moldova’s energy security strategy.
Status
In October 2023, President of Moldova Maia Sandu told the press that Moldova’s efforts to diversify its energy supply had improved the country’s independence. President Sandu said that “[W]e don’t buy Russian gas from Gazprom. We buy gas on the market, which means that Russia cannot blackmail us as it used to blackmail before, like a year ago, when every time they would not like the policies of the government in Moldova, they would just come back and say, ‘We cut gas supplies”. Notably, recent reporting has also pointed to a major increase in the use of renewable energy sources, specifically solar, by Moldova’s wine firms.
At time of writing (April 2026) Gazprom’s natural gas exports have shifted heavily toward China and specific countries in Europe and the Balkans. Amid disruptions, Gazprom have increased natural gas supplies to Europe via the Turkstream pipeline by 22% year over year in March.
Further, Moldova’s Energy Minister Dorin Junghietu has ruled out returning to a long-term supply contract with Gazprom. Junghietu emphasised the nation will instead accelerate its integration into the European energy market to ensure national security. The minister cited Gazprom’s unilateral decision to historically disrupt supplies as the primary motivation for decoupling.
Reference list
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AFP/AP. 2021. “Moldova says it will pay debts as Russia’s Gazprom threatens to cut gas supplies.” Euro News. November 23. Available at:https://www.euronews.com/ 2021/11/23/russian-gas-giant-gazprom-threatens-to-cut-supplies-to-moldova
AlJazeera. 2021. “Russia ‘weaponising’ gas supply in Moldova dispute, EU says.” AlJazeera. October 28. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/ 2021/10/28/eu-accu
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