China restricts Salmon Exports from Norway in 2010
Context
After being a major export market for Norwegian salmon, in 2010, Chinese imports of the product dropped sharply.
China cited concerns over the “safety and quality” of Norwegian salmon, with Chinese media reporting that restrictions would be in place “until importers can certify that the fish are free from infectious salmon anaemia as well as variants of the virus.” China initiated “strengthened inspection and quarantine procedures” contained in Notice 9 of 2011 issued by the Chinese State Administration of Quality Inspection, which included border inspections of consignments, greater administrative and permit requirements, changes to health certificate processes and other measures. These requirements resulted in substantial delays and fish rotting before delivery of consignments.
These restrictions were widely seen as politically motivated rather than legitimately being related to safety concerns. Specifically, the decline in imports coincided with a major diplomatic rift between Norway and China, occasioned by the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident and human rights activist Liu Xiaobo. While the Nobel Committee is an independent organisation that is not formally connected with the Norewegian Government, the Norwegian Parliament appoints the members of the Nobel Committee. Media outlets in the West reported the salmon restrictions as being in “apparent retribution” for the Nobel award.
Other actions reported as taking place in the context of the diplomatic rift between the countries included the cancellation of high-level inter-governmental meetings, and the stalling of negotiations for a free trade agreement that had started in 2008.
Impact
The restrictions made a clear impact on official imports into China of Norwegian salmon, with one study reporting a decline in export value for salmon between 2011 and 2013 of 125-176 million US Dollars. Another study of flow on effects found that banks in Norway that were highly exposed to salmon producers decreased their lending to non-salmon related sectors & domestic lending by 3-6%.
Overall, however, it has been reported that exports from Norway to China increased overall during the period of these tensions, with one extensive study concluding “there is no statistically significant proof that chemicals, machinery, oil, or seafood in general was hit by the sanctions.”
Some commentators consider the Norwegian Government’s decision not to meet with the Dalai Lama in 2014 to be evidence of the impact of these measures in influencing Norway’s action.
It has also been reported that black market imports of salmon into China increased substantially, including re-routing of shipments through Vietnam.
Responses
(i) Norwegian Government
According to media reports at the time, the Norwegian Government stated that it ” would not speculate as to why Beijing had ignored trade rules relating to Norwegian salmon.” Norway brought the matter to the WTO’s Specific Trade Concerns (STC) Committee repeatedly,
(ii) Chinese Government
Although China never officially confirmed that the inspection and quarantine measures were a response to diplomatic disputes between Norway and China, the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China reprinted a post from The Japan Times, stating that China’s import restrictions were a form of retaliation aimed at causing economic difficulties for Norway. In comments to media, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry was also quoted as saying, “Whoever tied the ring around the tiger’s neck must untie it”.
WTO Actions
See the archive of the Specific Trade Concerns Committee for this dispute.
Status
The conflict appeared to settle over time, and as noted above, Norwegian exports to China continued to grow.
In 2017, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Resumption of Free Trade Agreement Negotiations with negotiations “based on the principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit.”
The Chinese Ministry of Commerce said in March 2021 that the two countries would ‘complete negotiations as soon as possible’ on the trade agreement in the context of the improved relationship. However a 2022 piece in the South China Morning Post reported that “Norway says it will take the time it needs to consider ‘issues at stake and how to safeguard interests’ while negotiating with China.”
References & Further Information
Berge, Aslak. (2022). “Eye of the tiger: Gold diggers in the Chinese market” Salmon Business. February 1. Available at: https://www.salmonbusiness.com/in-the-tigers-eye-gold-diggers-in-the-chinese-market/
Chen, Xianwen., & Garcia, Roberto. J. (2016). Economic sanctions and trade diplomacy: Sanction-busting strategies, market distortion and efficacy of China’s restrictions on Norwegian salmon imports. China Information, 30(1), 29-57. https://doi.org/10.1177/0920203X15625061
Cao, Jin, Dinger, Valeriyam, Juelsrud, Ragnar & Liaudinskas, Karolis. 2023. “Trade conflicts and credit supply spillovers : Evidence from the Nobel Peace Prize trade shock,” Working Paper 2023/6, Norges Bank. Available at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/bno/worpap/2023_6.html
(2013) “China still miffed at Norway 3 years after Nobel awarded to dissident Liu Xiaobo” (2013) The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 October
Garcia, Roberto J. & Nguyen, Thi Ngan Giang, 2020. “Market Integration through Smuggling: China’s Sanction on Norwegian Salmon,” Working Paper Series 6-2019, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, School of Economics and Business.
Kolstad, Ivar (2016). Too big to fault? Effects of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize on Norwegian exports to China and foreign policy. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Working Paper WP 2016:03)
Liang Fei, 2011. “Tougher inspection rules hit Norwegian salmon exports to China.” Global Times. November 5. Available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/654055.shtml
Lewis, Mark. 2011. “Norway’s salmon rot as China takes revenge for dissident’s Nobel Prize.” The Independent. October 6. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/norway-s-salmon-rot-as-china-takes-revenge-for-dissident-s-nobel-prize-2366167.html
Nilsen, Kjell Arlid & Øgrim, Helge. 2015 Kina vs. Norge – den ukjente historien fra Maos nei til dagens krise : dokumentar. [China vs. Norway – the unknown story from Mao’s no to the crisis of today]. Link to purchase book
Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China,. 2013. ‘The Japan Times: Norway suffering snub highlights China’s strong diplomacy’ [日本日报: 挪威遭冷落展示中国锋锐外交]. October 29. Available at: http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinanorway/chinanorwaygfguandian/201508/27775_1.html.
Communication from Norway. 2011. ‘Quarantine and Testing Procedures Applied to Salmon Imported from Norway – Questions to China, G/SPS/GEN/1’. June 20. Available at: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=96589&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=1&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China (AQSIQ), ‘Notice on Strengthening Inspection and Quarantine on Imported Salmon, No. 9’ [关于加强进口三文鱼检验检疫的公告 (2011年第9号)] (28 January 2011), available at: http://shuju.aweb.com.cn/policy/20120614/4856.html.
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China (AQSIQ), ‘Measures for the Supervision and Quarantine on Imported and Exported Aquatic Product’ [进出口水产品检验检疫监督管理办法] (25 January 2011), available at: https://www.gov.cn/flfg/2011-01/25/content_1792161.htm.